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ABSTRACT 
While the theoretical case for applying market mechanisms 
to control pollution is persuasive, there are several stumbling 
blocks which arise in their application. This paper examines some 
of the key implementation issues which must be addressed in 
designing a marketable permit scheme. The issues are brought 
into focus by considering a particular example--the control of 
sulfur oxides emissions in Los Angeles. 
MARKETABLE PERMITS: WHAT'S ALL THE FUSS ABOUT?* 
Recently, both state and federal pollution control agencies have 
begun to direct their attention towards more economical alternatives 
which would meet environmental objectives.1 While it has been shown 
that schemes which offer firms greater choice in selecting abatement 
alternatives have the potential to significantly reduce the overall 
cost of meeting prescribed environmental goals, the response of indus­
try, the public and even regulators has been, at best, lukewarm. What 
might be the cause of this less-than-overwhelming response to new 
approaches for controlling pollution such as bubbles, offsets or mark­
etable permits? There would appear to be two key reasons for the cool 
reception. The first results from a lack of familiarity with the new 
regimes. The "command and control" technique currently employed is a 
well-seasoned approach which industry, regulators, and the public have 
dealt with on many occasions. It is possible that, in moving to an 
incentive-based approach, significant transitional costs would be 
incurred. A second reason for not adopting such schemes is that dis­
tributional issues may take precedence over efficiency considerations 
for many of the key industrial participants. This paper examines the 
problem of implementation for one particular alternative for dealing 
with pollution problems--marketable permits. The first part of the 
essay develops a simple framework for identifying implementation prob­
lems and points out several potential problem areas which need to be 
addressed. The second part of the essay addresses these issues using 
the specific example of setting up a market for controlling sulfur 
oxides emissions (SOX) in a well defined air quality region. 
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I, Developing .!!_ Framework 
As a starting point it is useful to construct a situation in 
which all firms would prefer a marketable permit scheme to a standards 
regime, The next step is to examine how real world considerations are 
at variance with the assumptions used to construct the example, 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between levels of abatement 
and control cost for a composite variable called "air pollution". 
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The curve passing through points B and C represents the minimum total 
cost of achieving a given level of abatement. Because of the difficul-
ties in obtaining information on the nature of the least cost solution, 
it is typically thought that regulation leaves us at an inefficient 
point such as A. Since pollution associated with the existing situa-
tion usually exceeds the prescribed standard, let point C correspond to 
the target level of air pollution. 
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We wish to consider whether it is possible to devise a marketable 
permit scheme which allows us to move from point A to point C, and 
which would be preferred by all industrial participants. First con-
sider the simpler problem of moving to a marketable permit scheme at 
the current level of pollution. This is represented by a move from A 
to B in the diagram. If transitional and administrative costs could be 
ignored, then it would be possible to move to a transferable rights 
scheme by issuing each firm an amount of permits which just equals 
their current level of emissions, This system of "grandfathering" the 
rights would be at least as good as the outcome under standards for 
some firms and unambiguously better for at least one firm (since the 
move from A to B implies that the overall level of abatement expendi-
tures would be reduced). 
The analysis of the situation in which the target air quality 
standard is more stringent (e.g., moving from A to C) is essentially 
similar to the argument given above, but requires one further assump-
tion. We must assume that the distribution of rights under the stan-
<lards approach is known for the level of pollution associated with C. 
With this assumption, it is sufficient to grandfather the rights in 
amounts which equal what they would have been under the standards 
regime. Under such a market scheme, all firms could be made at least 
as well off as they would be under a standards regime in which the 
rights to emit are nonnegotiable, since in the latter case, the air 
quality standard would be reached at a higher cost such as point D. 
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Two important factors ignored in the above analysis are the 
implications of uncertainty surrounding the rules to be promulgated by 
the agency, and the possibility that interested groups could influence 
the outcome. When these features are considered, the case for convinc-
ing industry that it is in their interest to adopt a permit scheme is 
considerably weakened. 
For the case in which the level of air pollution remains 
unchanged and rights are grandfathered, industry might balk at the 
marketable permit idea for several reasons. One reason mentioned ear-
lier is that use of a market to reach environmental goals is vastly 
different from the standards approach. Another possible objection is 
that grandfathering the rights is unfair because it tends to penalize 
those groups who have worked hardest to reduce their emissions. 
Finally, industry might argue that restrictions on trading combined 
with regulatory delay might lead to a system no better than the present 
situation, just different.
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If a marketable permit system is used to improve air quality over 
current levels, this introduces additional grounds for objecting to 
such a system. For example, industry might feel that the pollution 
associated with points C and D might never be met under a standards 
approach or that it would take a much longer time to reach the target. 
In either case, the discounted present value of staying at inefficient 
point A, with perhaps some chance of moving to inefficient point D in 
the future, could be less than the cost of immediately moving to C. 
Decreasing the level of pollution also makes the initial distribution 
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problem that much more difficult, since it is virtually impossible to 
know how firms would have fared if standards had remained in place. 
Movement to a marketable permit scheme also raises significant 
issues for regulators and the public. The regulatory agency must be 
capable of making the transition. Resistance to change can be 
expected, The agency may have to augment its monitoring and enforce-
ment staff to obtain more accurate measurements of emissions which 
could stand up in court. The economic tradeoff which must be con-
sidered is whether the increased administrative costs would be offset 
b h d . . b 3 y t e expecte cost savings in a atement. For the market to work, 
the agency would have to develop trading rules which are comprehensible 
and allow several firms to participate. 
The preceding list of objections might lead to the conclusion 
that the prospects for adopting this alternative in the near future are 
bleak. On the contrary, the prospects for adopting this alternative 
are very good indeed. This is especially true for pollutants which are 
not heavily regulated. A case in point would be nonaerosol chloro­
fluorocarbons. 4 
The basic reason for the growing possibility of actually experi-
menting with marketable permits is the increasingly widespread dissa-
tisfaction among environmentalists, industry and regulators with the 
existing standards regime--that is, if point A is bad enough, the 
objections can be overcome. Industry finds the red tape and uncer-
tainty very costly while regulators and environmentalists are 
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dissatisfied with the progress in abating pollution. Since marketable 
permits are known to possess desirable properties in theory and appear 
to be workable for several practical applications, experimentation with 
this approach may be just around the corner. In fact, the offset pol­
icy and bubble policy currently being used by the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency are almost identical conceptually to a marketable 
permit scheme, The bubble policy, as it currently operates, is merely 
a smaller version of the permit schemes which are envisioned. The 
offset policy differs from a transferable rights scheme in two 
respects: first, the firm purchasing an offset must reduce its emis­
sions to the lowest achievable level, 5 and second, the transaction 
costs in finding offsets and negotiating a price are excessive, A 
well-organized market could substantially reduce such costs, thus 
inducing more trading. 
The federal experience to date with bubbles, banking and offsets 
has not been a success for two reasons: uncertainty and regulatory 
delay, The principal areas of uncertainty concern who has the property 
rights and for how long. The regulatory delay is primarily caused by 
the cumbersome State Implementation Plan review process. If an incen­
tive based mechanism is to work effectively, both of these issues must 
be squarely addressed. By providing firms with some minimum guarantees 
on the duration for which their rights are negotiable, it is likely 
that trades would increase significantly. Similarly, if the review 
process could be expedited and trading rules could be clarified, all 
involved would benefit, Not surprisingly, the problems which befuddle 
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the current incentive-based approaches could just as easily arise under 
a marketable permit scheme, 
The preceding analysis provides some insights into the implemen­
tation problems which can be expected to arise in setting up an artifi­
cial market to control emissions. The next section takes a detailed 
look at one particular pollution problem--sulfur oxides emissions in 
Los Angeles. 
II. A. Potential Application 
To demonstrate the viability of marketable permits without actu­
ally implementing the alternative requires selecting a specific pollu­
tant, identifying the key implementation problems, and then designing a 
market which will address these issues, As an example, the problem of 
controlling particulate sulfates in the Los Angeles region was 
selected,
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This problem was chosen because it appeared to be a likely 
candidate for marketable permits, The scientific aspects of the prob­
lem are well understood, Data on sulfur oxides abatement costs are 
available or can be constructed for most of the key sources, and moni­
toring and enforcement problems appear tractable. 
The question at hand is whether such a market could actually 
work. First, the criteria for measuring the success of a market need 
to be specified. For this specific case we would like to design a 
market that will meet air quality goals in a more cost-effective manner 
than the current system of source-specific standards, that will 
encourage investment in finding new abatement technologies for the 
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future, and that will be legally acceptable and politically feasible. 
Legal feasibility means that the market must meet the requirements of 
relevant constitutional and statutory constraints. Political feasibil­
ity means that the regulatory agency should be capable of administering 
the program and that the approach has a reasonable chance of being 
acceptable enough to industry, the public and regulators that it stands 
a chance of being enacted by political officials. 
To meet air quality goals requires a good technical understanding 
of the problem. The particulate sulfate problem in Los Angeles is 
caused primarily by the combustion of sulfur-bearing energy products. 
Particulate sulfates are an important concern because they tend to 
reduce visibility, acidify rainwater, and may also have harmful health 
effects. The conversion of sulfur oxides emissions to sulfates in Los 
Angeles can be thought of as proceeding in three stages. First, sulfur 
enters the air basin. Virtually, all of the sulfur which man uses in 
the Los Angeles area enters in a barrel of crude oil. Second, when oil 
products are refined or burned, some of the sulfur contained in them is 
converted to so2 and so3 which is released to the atmosphere. Finally, 
the SOX compounds react to form sulfates through a series of atmos­
pheric chemical processes. Cass (1978) has shown that the relation 
between sulfur oxides emissions and sulfate air quality in Los Angeles 
is approximately linear and, in addition, can be modeled as if it were 
largely independent of the level of other key pollutants. Given a sul­
fate air quality objective, it will be possible to use an environmental 
model to compute the corresponding level of permissible emissions. 7 
9 
The current approach towards controlling sulfur oxides emissions 
relies on standards and an offset policy. New sources of pollution 
must trade off the uncontrolled portion of their emissions by effecting 
further reductions at existing sources in the Los Angeles Basin. The 
owner of an existing source is thus vested with a valuable property 
right which can be sold in whole or in part to new source owners. The 
owner also has the option of holding onto his current abatement possi­
bilities to facilitate subsequent expansion. 
The offset policy is one limited form of a market in transferable· 
licenses to emit air pollutants. Its principal drawbacks are that the 
costs of negotiation are excessive and the number of trades which can 
be made by new sources are limited. Negotiation costs are high because 
new entrants must first identify existing sources of pollution where 
emissions reductions are feasible, then try to estimate a reasonable 
charge for the offset, and finally perhaps have to purchase the entire 
business operations of some polluter. Purchases of offsets by new 
firms are limited by the requirement that new firms must reduce emis­
sions to the lowest achievable level before being allowed to enter the 
offset market. Presumably, in a full-blown marketable permit scheme, 
all specific source by source restrictions on burning sulfur would be 
lifted. This would tend to increase the number of mutually beneficial 
trades. In addition, the market obviates the need for bilateral bar­
gaining, which is cumbersome and unnecessary. By conveying a uniform 
price for a permit, the market also ensures that rights will go to 
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the highest bidder, and the marginal value of a right owned by a firm 
will approximate the market price, 
While the market in licenses can attain a least cost solution, 
this cannot be assumed. In constructing a market in sulfur oxides 
emissions licensee for Loe Angeles, care has to be taken to ensure that 
a few firms will not be able to dominate. Table 1 gives some indica-
tion of the relative market shares of sulfur oxides emissions in 1973 
and projected shares for 1980 under a low natural gas scenario. 
TABLE 1 
Past and Projected "Market Shares" for Sulfur Oxides Emissions 
by Source Type for the South Coast Air Basin 
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1973 F.missions 1980s Projection - low natural gas 
scenario and 197 7 emissions 
control regulations 
Source 
Type 
Utility 
Mobile Sources 
Utility 
Oil Company 
Steel Company 
Oil Company 
Coke Calcining 
Oil Company 
Oil Company 
Oil Company 
% of Total 
Emiseionsb 
28 
16 
11 
8 
7 
3 
Company 3 
3 
2 
2 
Source 
Type 
Utility 
Mobile Sources 
Utility 
Oil Company 
Coke Calcining 
Oil Company 
Steel Company 
Oil Company 
Oil Company 
Oil Company 
% of Total 
Emiesionsb 
31 
27 
10 
4 
Company 4 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
These figures are based on sources located within the 1974 
definition of geographic boundaries of the South Coast Air Basin 
(which was subsequently revised). 
bEmieeions are rounded to the nearest percent. 
Source: Based on author's calculations from data used to compile 
Cass (1978) and Cass (1979). 
The low natural gas scenario is essentially a worst case because the 
absence of natural gas means that fuel with higher sulfur content will 
be burned. If this pattern of emissions is accurate, the electric 
utilities can be expected to account for the largest share of emis-
sions. Note that mobile sources account for more than one-fourth of 
the total in the 1980s scenario. To force all mobile sources to parti-
cipate in the market would, needless to say, be quite expensive. 
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Fortunately, it may be possible to transfer this responsibility to 
local oil companies since they make the gasoline, diesel oil, jet fuel, 
and bunker fuel burned by mobile sources, 
While a transition to a market in tradable licenses will almost 
certainly imply different market shares from those presented above, the 
electric utilities can still be expected to have the largest share of 
the market. This presents some difficulties because even if the utili­
ties act as cost minimizers their interaction with the public utilities 
commission rate-setting process might provide incentives towards 
investing in licenses which differ from more conventional privately­
held firms, The problem of predicting utility behavior in a license 
market is currently being investigated by examining how other durable 
assets, such as real estate, are treated, and by observing utility 
behavior under the current system of offsets and banking. 
Given that competition in such a market is not a foregone conclu­
sion, it is important to ask what happens if some of the safeguards 
don't work and some of the firms successfully manipulate the price of a 
license. While this would certainly affect the distribution of income 
and should be avoided if possible, it by no means renders the system a 
complete failure. In fact, so long as the market provides greater 
flexibility for firms wishing to locate in Los Angeles while maintain­
ing the current level of air quality, this will be a big step forward 
over current policy. 
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Some critics fear the market may not have a sufficient number of 
trades to be competitive. In the jargon of the economist, this is the 
problem of "thin" markets. The extreme case of a thin market is when 
no trading occurs. From a practical point of view, this lack of trad­
ing would be a concern even if firms in the area were at an equilibrium 
which minimized aggregate abatement costs. The concern stems from the 
observation that new firms wishing to enter the area would receive lit­
tle information on the cost of entry, The solution to this problem is 
to devise a system which will give potential entrants a price signal 
when the market becomes too thin. One alternative whose properties are 
currently being investigated, is to have existing firms put a small 
percentage of their permits up for sale, Anyone wishing to bid on 
these licenses, including existing participants, would be encouraged to 
do so, Under such a scheme, new entrants would have a better idea of 
the cost of emitting sulfur oxides in Los Angeles. 
While questions of efficiency are important, distributional 
issues must also be addressed if the market is to become a politically 
viable entity, One important concern in moving to a market to control 
sulfur oxides air pollutants is the transitional costs which firms will 
face, Some firms or industries may be forced to shut down. For exam­
ple, if a firm competes in a national market and faces an elastic 
demand for its product, it may be the case that the costs of entering a 
license market could force it to move to another area where environmen­
tal regulations are less costly, Estimates of the likelihood of firm 
closings obtained so far indicate that plant closure will not be a 
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problem in this specific case.8 If the policy maker wishes to avoid 
plant closings, this issue can be addressed through a suitable initial 
distribution of licenses. 
To gain some perspective on the distribution problem, it is use-
ful to have a qualitative estimate of the size of the "pie." Prelim-
inary estimates of the total annual value of emissions (i.e., the price 
of a license multiplied by the quantity issued) are in the neighborhood 
of 150 million dollars per year.9 Assuming there are roughly 10 million
people in the South Coast Air Basin implies that each person could 
receive 15 dollars per year if the licenses were auctioned and the 
proceeds were distributed to the public. Some critics have argued that 
the magnitude of the potential wealth transfers involved does not bode 
well for marketable permits in the political arena. While problems 
with distribution can be viewed as a barrier to implementation, there 
is an alternative view that control over the distribution of permits 
makes it that much more likely that a politically acceptable solution 
can be found. 
What is really at issue here is who will be given the property 
rights to the air, and for how long. It is quite likely that a large 
part of the resistance to emissions tax proposals is related to the 
realization that under most taxation schemes, emissions rights will 
k bl. d . 10revert bac to the pu le oma1n. This is, in essence, the nature of 
the excess burden or double taxation argument which states that it is 
unfair for industry to have to pay the tax and pay to clean up as well. 
The alleged inequity of the excess burden can be directly addressed in 
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a marketable permit scheme. In the extreme case, all licenses could be 
distributed to industry if that were deemed fair or necessary to enlist 
industrys' cooperation. Alternatively, some of the proceeds could go 
directly to the public or could be used to finance administrative 
costs. The basic point is that adopting a marketable permits approach 
provides a great deal of flexibility in addressing distributional 
issues. 
The final question which needs to be addressed is whether the 
infrastructure exists to handle a marketable permits scheme. There is 
currently a nominal emissions fee system in place for the South Coast 
Air Basin. Each firm is required to complete a form analogous to an 
income tax form which gives annual emissions for air contaminants which 
are subject to the fee. The principal purpose of the fee system is to 
cover a part of the operating cost of the South Coast Air Quality 
Management District (AQMD), For example, during the 1980-81 fiscal 
year, fees can be expected to cover about 30 percent of the projected 
20 million dollar budget.11 Sulfur oxides emissions are one of five 
air pollutants which come under the fee system. The charge for emit­
ting a ton of sulfur oxides is $21.12 This can be compared with a 
license price which is estimated to be in the neighborhood of $1,000 
per ton for the case in which sulfur oxides emissions remain at their 
present levels. Though the AQMD currently handles all disputeu over 
emissions fees within the agency, when the price of emissions increases 
by one or two orders of magnitude, it is quite likely that the courts 
will play some role in settling disputes. 
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The problem is to figure out how to minimize the role of the 
courts. One way is by carefully defining a license in terms which can 
be monitored, Two obvious choices sre to define a license in terms of 
a short-term maximum emissions rate such as a pound per hour, or in 
terms of a cumulative measure of emissions over a longer time interval. 
For the case of sulfur oxides emissions it would probably be preferable 
to define a license in terms of cumulative emissions over a time inter-
val such as a week or a month, but the problem is that integrated stack 
monitors do not exist which would provide the necessary information to 
demonstrate that a violation had actually occurred, On the other hand, 
the technology for determining whether a source has violated a short­
term maximum emission rate does exist, Thie can be accomplished by a 
team of 4 or 5 technicians performing a source test, 
The monitoring and enforcement of a marketable permit scheme to 
control sulfur oxides emissions is well within the grasp of the AQMD. 
It is a relatively straightforward manner to monitor cumulative emie-
s ions for utilities and the majority of industrial sources who do not 
use any abatement equipment for reducing sulfur oxides emissions, The 
only information that is required to estimate emissions is the quantity 
of fuel burned and the sulfur content of the fuel. For those sources 
who do not route all of the sulfur input into the air, the task is less 
straightforward, The major sources in this category include the oil 
refiners, coke calciners, glass manufacturers and steel manufacturers. 
There are two basic approaches which can be used to monitor stack emis­
sions. One is the source test performed by technicians. The second is 
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to install monitoring equipment which indicates the concentration of 
sulfur within a small area in the stack. Unfortunately, without some 
estimate of the flow rate, it is impossible to know the cumulative 
emissions, While the use of stack monitors for measuring SOX is still
in its infancy and the estimates are not always reliable, they may be 
used as a continuous check to determine when a firm's emissions appear 
to be exceeding its permits. 
There are currently about 20 stack monitors in place and 100 are 
expected to be in place by the end of 1980 in the South Coast Air 
Basin.13 One possibility for enforcing the SOX permit scheme is to 
sample firms at random to see if they are in violation. This random 
sampling approach could be augmented by a program which uses the infor­
mation provided by the continuous monitoring system installed in many 
of the larger sources, 
It is likely that the current monitoring and enforcement staff, 
which has a little less than 200 members, would have to be increased if 
a SOX marketable permit scheme were implemented, The size of the 
required increase is not certain, and depends on an assessment of how 
well the current system works, By all accounts of people interviewed, 
both in and outside the AQMD, the system for monitoring SOX 
emissions 
works well now, so I feel that, at most, it would cost the agency an 
additional million dollars annually to monitor,14 This amount is 
easily offset by the expected cost saving to be derived from using 
marketable permits, 
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There are some legal problems which need to be addressed in the 
implementation phase. For example, it is not clear whether under 
current law the AQMD can penalize violators by fining them in accord 
with the severity of the violation. It would be desirable to have a 
system of fines which could be administratively imposed in order to 
minimize the role of the courts. In addition, the question of who 
should be given the burden of proof needs to be addressed. The current 
reporting system for emissions is analogous to federal income tax 
reporting with the polluter responsible for substantiating his claims 
when the AQMD estimates differ with those submitted by the polluter. 
The exact form of the fine raises some interesting issues. 
First, consider the objectives in designing a penalty system. The 
basic objective is to provide firms with a strong incentive to play by 
the rules so the air quality target will be met. But, how strong an 
incentive? Clearly, if the penalties were made high enough and there 
were some probability of getting caught, all firms would play by the 
rules. There is a question, however, both from a legal and an adminis­
trative perspective, as to how high you can make the penalties and 
still have them be workable. If the penalties far exceed the estimated 
damages, the courts are not likely to uphold them and the regulators 
might be reluctant to impose them. Such might be the case if all vio­
lations were to be punished by closing down the plant. Thus, in addi­
tion to providing an incentive for firms not to exceed their allowed 
emissions, a penalty scheme should be enforceable. 
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There are no magic formulas for determining a penalty scheme. 
The basic theoretical approach is to try to maximize the difference 
between social benefits and social costs. Operationally, this is not 
very helpful. If the firm's violation is viewed as marginal, then a 
less grandiose objective might be to equate the firm's marginal benefit 
from the violation with the marginal cost to society of allowing such a 
violation, The firm's marginal benefit can be estimated by members of 
the firm, but, in all likelihood, is not public information. The mar­
ginal physical damage to society of such a violation is anybody's 
guess, but can usefully be separated into two components: the probabil­
ity of getting caught, p, given that a firm is in violation, and the 
damage due to a violation, D, which is detected. We shall then define 
the expected marginal physical damage to society of a violation D, 
which is detected as (D/p). The problem is to operationalize this 
notion by defining physical damages more precisely and converting them 
to monetary damages. 
Quantification of damages is always difficult. For illustrative 
purposes suppose that damages are a function, f, of the size of the 
difference between monitored emissions and permits currently held by 
the firm. Call this difference x so that damages are represented by 
D=f(x). Let F be the size of the fine in dollars and let � be the 
price of a marketable permit. Equation (1) represents a preliminary 
attempt to link the fine to damages, the probability of getting caught 
when in violation and the existing price for polluting, �. 
F = f(x)Q. 
p 
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(1) 
The numerator of equation (1) represents an estimate of the monetary 
value of damages. Dividing through by p gives a measure of expected 
damages. Thus, the firm is supposed to compare its expected marginal 
benefits with expected damages. 
Though there is nothing wrong with equation (1) conceptually, it 
suffers from one serious flaw. Such a penalty system can be circum-
vented by driving the price of a permit to zero. This situation could 
easily arise if a sufficiently large number of firms chose not to par-
ticipate in the market. Equation (1) is easily modified to deal with 
this issue. Let 'a' be a parameter set by the regulator which could 
reflect the expected market price of a permit if all firms were to par-
ticipate in the market. This gives rise to equation (2) which captures 
the spirit of (1), but does not fall prey to manipulation as easily, 
F = f(x) Max(a,�) 
p 
( 2) 
In Equation (2), "Max" denotes the maximum of a and 9,. Thus, at a 
minimum, a firm caught in violation would have to pay f(x)a/p. 
The nature of the damage function, f(x), needs to be spelled out, 
If the objective is to keep firms close to their permit levels, then it 
makes sense to increase the marginal cost when the size of the 
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violation increases. This is easily accomplished by letting f(x) = Kxn 
where K is an arbitrary constant and n exceeds unity. Substitution 
into (2) yields: 
n 
F = Kx Max(a,9.) (3) 
p 
Equation (3) is offered merely as one possibility for designing a 
penalty scheme. It has the virtue that it is simple, and all the 
parameters can be estimated, at least roughly. Furthermore, it crudely 
relates benefits to costs, and also would appear to be consistent with 
the postulated objectives for a penalty system. 
The point of going through this exercise of designing a fee was 
to demonstrate a general approach to the problem as well as noting some 
of the difficulties in moving from theory to practice. The above for-
mulation is simplistic. It assumes away many of the measurement prob-
lems. For example, there is obviously some uncertainty in measuring x, 
Nevertheless, it is our belief that source tests are sufficiently accu-
rate to warrant a penalty design which assesses fines which are commen-
surate with the size of the violation, Another problem is that p is 
really an endogenous variable, which depends on the penalty scheme 
actually adopted, making it difficult to estimate before implementation 
begins. In addition, the probability of detection may vary with the 
size of the violation. 
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The detailed design of a penalty system will require further distinc­
tions not made here, For example, firms who report violations should 
be subject to less severe penalties than firms who do not. In the 
above model, p could be set equal to unity for firms reporting viola­
tions, In actuality, firms caught cheating on their reported emissions 
could be subject to other civil or criminal sanctions, similar to those 
imposed by the Internal Revenue Service. 
The first objective in designing a penalty scheme was to induce 
firms not to exceed the allowable level of emissions most of the time. 
However, it was recognized that there may be unforeseen circumstances, 
such as an equipment failure, when a firm might violate its emission 
limit for a short time, Just as it is important to identify extenuat­
ing circumstances for the individual firm, it is also important to 
identify situations where a marketable permit scheme may be inappropri­
ate. For the case of SOX emissions in Los Angeles, these are two types 
of uncertainty which can be expected to strain the system. The first 
is the unpredictability of the natural gas supply. The permit scheme 
can handle this uncertainty in two ways: either by forcing industry to 
deal with this uncertainty or providing some relief in the form of 
issuing temporary permits should a crisis situation arise, The second 
major area of uncertainty is the problem of air pollution episodes 
which require dramatic action on the part of all participants. Because 
such events are very difficult to predict in advance, the best way of 
handling these situations is probably to suspend the permit system and 
invoke tighter regulations during these brief periods. 
23 
The preceding discussion indicates that it will be possible to 
design a market in tradable SOX emission licenses for Los Angeles. 
Monitoring and enforcement capabilities currently exist, but will prob­
ably have to be expanded. A fee system needs to be worked out in 
detail which will induce firms not to exceed their allowed level of 
emissions. In addition, the problem of obtaining revenues to admin­
ister the market must be addressed. One simple solution is to set a 
nominal fee on SOX emissions analogous to the 21 dollar/ton fee which 
is applied now, Such a fee could be expected to lower the permit price 
by the discounted value of the fee. 
III. Conclusions 
In a world not beset by uncertainty, but befuddled by pollution 
problems, it was possible to construct an example in which marketable 
permits were preferable to standards. In the real world in which we 
live, the comparison is less straightforward. There are transitional 
costs in moving to a new system, Not all firms will necessarily be 
winners in moving to a permit scheme. It is possible that firms may 
face higher abatement costs than under standards for the simple reason 
that the air quality goals may be reached more quickly. 
Despite these objections, there appears to be an increasing wil­
lingness on the part of all groups to experiment with new kinds of 
environmental regulation, This enthusiasm is derived, in part, from 
the observation that the command and control approach is not working 
for many problems, It is burdensome administratively, and even though 
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industry can sometimes foster delays in enacting regulations, the 
attendant uncertainties can be very expensive for firms who have long-
term planning horizons. It might be the case that coalitions can be 
formed which are willing to consider alternatives such as marketable 
permits which can provide greater certainty. 
If regulatory agencies decide to experiment with marketable per-
mits, it is of paramount importance that some assurances be placed on 
the minimum duration of a permit. In addition, trading rules need to 
be spelled out clearly. If environmental agencies adopt a marketable 
permits approach and change the rules capriciously, they run the risk 
of losing support for a tool which can be a most-effective means of 
controlling pollution problems, 
The importance of selecting the right problem cannot be overem-
phasized, It is helpful to have an understanding of the relationship 
between emissions and pollution so the target can be attained without 
having to iterate frequently. A monitoring and enforcement capability 
is imperative. Many environmental regulatory agencies currently do not 
have the resources or the expertise to successfully monitor and imple-
ment a marketable permit scheme, The final element necessary to assess 
the viability of the marketable permit alternative is an estimate of 
what it will cost industry to clean up the problem. This information 
can be used to identify implementation problems and design a market 
which will address these issues. 
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Footnotes 
*The work reported here was supported in part by the California Air 
Resources Board, This paper has benefited from discussions with 
Jim Krier, Eric Lemke and Roger Noll. The views expressed herein, 
including any remaining errors, are solely the responsibility of 
the author. 
1. Krier and Bell (1980) provide an insightful discussion on the 
relationship between some of the new approaches being proposed 
such as bubbles, offsets and marketable permits, and the 
traditional approaches to environmental regulation, 
2. A summary of industrys' skeptical perspective on the bubble 
policy which supports this view is contained in Environment 
Reporter (1980). 
3, Both the study by MATHTECH and the study by Rand indicate that 
expected cost savings are much greater than any expected increase 
in administrative costs. 
4. This is the subject of the Rand study prepared for the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 
S. U,S. Environmental Protection Agency (1980), p. 8, 
6, The Los Angeles region refers to the South Coast Air Basin and 
a part of Ventura County. The current definition of the South 
Coast Air Basin includes all of Orange County, the majority of 
Los Angeles County and parts of San Bernardino and Riverside 
County. See Air Report (1980) for a more precise 
definition. 
7. See Cass (1978) for a description of the model and the validacion 
procedure. 
8. There are two possible exceptions to this conclusion--a large steel 
manufacturer which may close down before the system could get 
underway, and the glass manufacturers who account for less than
1% of current emissions, but have very high abatement costs. It
appears that both of these problems could easily be handled through 
a distribution scheme that is politically acceptable. 
9. The calculations and methodology for obtaining these estimates
are explained in Hahn (1981).
10. This point may need further clarification for readers with a legal 
perspective on the issue. In a legal sense, it may be true that the 
public has a claim on such rights. The point made here is that 
regardless of who has the claim, industry is, de facto, exercising 
the right whenever it spews forth emissions which are sanctioned 
by law. 
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11. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980). 
12. Small emitters as defined in Rule 301 of the Rules and Regulations 
are exempted. Sox is measured in equivalent tons of so2• 
13. Based on interview with Eric Lemke (1980). 
14. This upper bound estimate is based on the assumption that up to 
25 or 30 more technicians might need to be hired. 
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